Current Projects:
Below are a list of some of the projects that I am currently working on. Please see my vita for detail of other projects.
Human Capital and Strategic Foresight: Evidence from Insider Trading (with Nauman Asghar, Russ Coff, and Philipp Meyer-Doyle)
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Status: Working draft
We explore how the nature of human capital of corporate leaders (generalist vs specialist) shapes their strategic foresight. Examining insider trading—an important manifestation of strategic foresight—associated with product introduction announcements, we find that specialists' insider trading is associated with greater strategic foresight than generalists’ insider trading. Yet, generalists can narrow this difference if they hold firm-contextual knowledge, which enhances their accuracy when they apply their broad knowledge to the firm. Yet, despite the apparent advantages of specialist knowledge for strategic foresight, we find that generalists engage in more insider trading before product introduction announcements than specialists, and this effect is stronger when generalists hold firm-contextual knowledge. Our study offers fresh contributions to the strategic human capital literature and research on strategic foresight.
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Intra- and Inter-Group Dynamics and the Market for Quality: Evidence from the Mobility of Elite Professionals (with Claudia Gabbioneta and Daniel Muzio)
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Status: Under Review
Knowledge-based organizations rely on the knowledge, skills, and relationships of their talented workers to build their competitive advantage. This creates incentives to recruit “the best and the brightest” professionals in their respective fields, with the expectation of improved performance. Prior research, however, challenges the assumption that recruiting talented workers necessarily improves group and firm performance, and has explored several key contingencies affecting this relationship. In this study, we investigate how intra- and inter-group factors moderate the relationship between recruiting a talented individual into a group and that group’s quality-performance. Using a longitudinal panel dataset of the largest UK corporate law firms between 2000 and 2017, we show that while recruiting an elite professional into a group (legal practice) generally reduces group quality, this negative effect is weaker when the average quality of the incumbent professionals in the group is higher, and stronger when the organization comprises a higher number of other high-quality groups. Our study contributes to the strategic human capital, employee mobility, and team dynamics, literatures and has practical implications for managers.
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Supplier Switching and Bargaining Over Value: Competition and Behavioral Uncertainty (with Bertrand Quelin)
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Status: Working draft
We combine competitive strategy, transaction cost economics, and relational contracting literatures to investigate how exchange price changes when a buyer switches its supplier. Using price as an observable indicator of value appropriation, we develop theory and predictions for how bargaining under competition and behavioral uncertainty influences price in the initial exchange ex-post of supplier switching. We then extend our empirical analysis to examine the evolution of price over repeated buyer-supplier exchange and across supplier strategic groups. Our findings provide insights into how ex-post exchange hazards interact with competition to influence relative bargaining power and price, over time. We also reveal important differences across supplier strategic groups that increase our understanding of how firms with different market power are affected by competitive forces and ex-post risk.